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Introduction: Identifying and Differentiating
As the immediate precursor to poststructuralism, the movement or para-
digm of structuralism was naturally responsible for determining many of 
poststructuralism’s salient features. But what was structuralism, and how are 
we to understand its transformation into poststructuralism? In this chapter 
I will address these issues by first outlining the contours of what might be 
called the image of structuralism. An appreciation of this image is necessary 
for a full understanding of the shift from structuralism to poststructuralism. 
Nevertheless, an acknowledgement of its limitations, of the inconsistencies 
it suppresses and the inaccuracies it perpetrates, is equally necessary. As I 
will therefore demonstrate, alongside the formation and propagation of the 
classical structuralist image runs a history of its transformation – a history 
of those aspects and individuals who subverted the image of structuralism 
in one way or other, as it was in the process of emerging.
 Many of these aspects and individuals will in time be collected under 
the banner of ‘poststructuralism’. But as we will see, this raises several 
problems. Firstly, how are we to comprehend and categorise these various 
proto-developments? Are they properly poststructuralist, or merely a dif-
ferent kind of structuralism? If the former, how can poststructuralism pre-
exist its own emergence, and if the latter, then what is it that distinguishes 
structuralism from poststructuralism? Such considerations are made even 
more difficult by the fact that almost none of the thinkers identified today as 
‘poststructuralist’ ever used the term, let alone self-identified with it. These 
issues, however, belie a larger problem that has been of concern to structur-
alists and poststructuralists alike: the problematic nature of transformation. 
If we are to make sense of the shift from structuralism to poststructuralism, 
the manner in which we make sense will itself require analysis and critique. A 
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historical analysis of the relation between structuralism and poststructural-
ism will thus arguably take us only so far. In addition to this history, what will 
also be required is an analysis of the particular problematics from which our 
investigation garners its imperative force. By considering the problematic 
nature of the transformation from structuralism to poststructuralism in 
conjunction with its history, a final and perhaps more pressing question will 
be raised: what is it that drives our interest in the shift from structuralism 
to poststructuralism, and what is the importance of these two terms for us 
today?
The Image of Structuralism
Structuralism was a largely French intellectual movement that began in the 
1950s and rose to great prominence throughout the 1960s and ’70s. At its 
height, structuralism was the leading intellectual paradigm in France, with 
advocates to be found in a vast range of disciplines. Influential thinkers who 
were associated with the movement at one point or another included Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Louis 
Althusser, Nicos Poulantzas, Algirdas Julian Greimas, Tzvetan Todorov, 
Jacques Derrida and Pierre Bourdieu. Structuralism promised to unlock 
the mysteries of human culture by suggesting new ways for looking at and 
approaching social relations. Much of the impetus for these new techniques 
and insights originated from disciplines in the social sciences such as anthro-
pology, linguistics, semiology, psychoanalysis and sociology. Although more 
traditional disciplines such as philosophy and history would in time come to 
make enormous contributions to the nature and success of structuralism, at 
its inception structuralism was wedded to the post-World War II rise of the 
social sciences and their explicit critique of venerated academic institutions 
(such as the Sorbonne) and their traditionally favoured disciplinary agendas.
 Structuralism, as such, was an eminently modern movement that sought 
to break away from previous academic constraints by entirely recasting 
the terms and conditions for understanding human existence. Central to 
this intellectual revolution was the quest for scientificity. Due to its strong 
affiliation with science and scientific method, early structuralism was able 
to radically distinguish itself from traditional approaches to society in the 
humanities and consequently position itself between (if not above) the sci-
ences and the arts. As Francois Wahl put it in his introduction to Qu’est-ce 
que le structuralisme?, structuralism had a specifically ‘scientific vocation’ 
(Wahl 1968: 7). This vocation provided structuralism with an immensely 
seductive programme that purported to replace subjective conjecture with 
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objective truth in the social domain. The desire for social disciplines to 
partake in the successes of science was of course hardly a new phenomenon. 
History, to name just one example, had carried out a similar appropriation 
of science in the second half of the nineteenth century, when it attempted 
to detach itself from philosophy and literature in order to recast its method 
as astutely objective.1 But like history before it, this quest for scientificity 
in the social realm would ultimately fail, despite its great advances; in time, 
the validity of structuralism’s scientific credentials would be exposed by 
critics and modified or abandoned by poststructuralists, leaving classical 
structuralism adrift between the port it had left and the promised land it 
never quite reached.
 Part of the desire to attain scientificity was driven by the widespread disil-
lusionment with ideology in the mid to late 1950s. In the period following 
the end of WWII, French culture and politics were dominated by Marxism 
and existentialism. Political events would, however, come to severely under-
mine the popularity and credibility of these movements. In 1956, Nikita 
Khrushchev delivered a report to the Twentieth Party Congress, titled ‘On 
the Personality Cult and its Consequences’, in which he catalogued the 
extensive crimes committed by Stalin. Although Khrushchev’s speech was 
largely motivated by party politics, its delivery would have far-reaching con-
sequences for Soviet sympathisers throughout the West. When combined 
with the violent repression of the Hungarian revolution of the same year, 
Stalinism became untenable and Marxism tainted for many Western intel-
lectuals of the Left. Structuralism, with its scientific rather than ideological 
premises, offered an attractive way out of this quandary for many.
 This was achieved through a number of further key attributes, objec-
tives and objections. To begin with, structuralism distanced itself from the 
diachronic methodology of Marxist thought, and more broadly Hegelian 
dialectics, through an insistence upon synchronicity. As a scientific method 
for analysing the relations within and between structures/series, structural-
ism developed and employed synchronic models in which all of the struc-
tural and inter-structural relations for a given situation were simultaneously 
present, or more specifically, coexistent (even if particular elements were 
themselves obscured). Synchronicity thus allowed for the inner logic of a 
structure or series to be revealed in its entirety at once, without having to 
wait for the diachronic development of past or future defining elements that 
may be unknown or unidentifiable at present.
 This synchronic methodology effectively amounted to a challenge of his-
tory and the historical form of explanation. Understanding, according to 
structuralism, was not gained through an analysis of diachronic development, 
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nor was a system to be explained by the evolution of its elements over time. 
Instead, structuralism maintained that in order to fully understand a system, 
whether it is language or some other system, the entirety of its relations 
needed to be simultaneously considered in order to ‘see’ what was hidden 
from view and ‘hear’ what was unspoken. Structuralism, however, did not 
merely claim that synchronic and ahistorical models provided for greater 
systematic understanding: more profoundly, it argued that these structures 
were in fact universal. For instance, structural linguists did not devise a 
linguistic system that applied to one language alone. Rather, they compared 
the continuities and discontinuities between different language systems in 
order to devise synchronic models that could be applied to many languages, 
both similar and disparate. Such models, once constructed, were thus uni-
versally applicable. Structural psychoanalysis, to give another example, was 
not created as a theory and practice that corresponded to only some people. 
On the contrary, psychoanalysis identifies principles and procedures that 
should be of pertinence to everyone, regardless of time and place, due to the 
scientifically verifiable status of its universal methods and claims.
 These aspects of classical structuralism (scientificity, synchronicity, ahis-
toricism, universalism and a withdrawal from the immediately preceding 
political climate) were most clearly reflected in the work of Claude Lévi-
Strauss – the father of structuralism. Lévi-Strauss was an anthropologist 
who sought to provide his discipline with a new grounding. As Francois 
Dosse explains in his peerless History of Structuralism, in the mid-1940s 
anthropology was in desperate need of renewal. French anthropology had for 
some time been dominated by naturalist and biological predilections, such 
as the search for Man’s natural foundations (Dosse 1997a: 16–17). By the 
close of WWII, however, the racist undertones of these traditional investiga-
tions were no longer palatable, and anthropology required a new direction 
capable of severing ties with the past. Lévi-Strauss duly obliged. According 
to Simone de Beauvoir, the urgency of the situation was such that resist-
ance from the anthropological establishment to Lévi-Strauss’ new ideas was 
virtually non-existent: ‘The historical liquidation of physical anthropology 
had made theoretical debate unnecessary. Claude Lévi-Strauss arrived on 
the spot that history had prepared for him’ (de Beauvoir quoted in Dosse 
1997a: 16).
 Lévi-Strauss capitalised upon this golden opportunity by adopting a par-
ticular strand of linguistic theory for his anthropological work. This, again, 
was made possible in part by accidental circumstances involving WWII. 
Following the French capitulation to the Nazi’s in 1940, Lévi-Strauss fled 
to New York City where he took up a position at the New School. While in 
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New York, Lévi-Strauss was introduced by Alexandre Koyré to the Russian 
linguist Roman Jakobson, who in turn introduced Lévi-Strauss to linguistics 
and Saussurian phonology in particular (Lévi-Strauss and Eribon 1991: 41). 
According to this linguistic theory, elements of a language, and in particular 
phonological differences, can only be appropriately understood through a 
consideration of their interrelationships. Saussure’s linguistic theory, as 
conveyed to Lévi-Strauss by Jakobson (who had developed his linguistic 
theory with Nikolai Trubetzkoy), thus advanced and relied upon a synchronic 
notion of system in order to extract constants within and between languages 
from which general laws could then be constructed. Lévi-Strauss seized 
upon this insight: in the same way that Saussurian linguistics provided a 
universal method and model for analysing spoken languages from contem-
porary Europe to colonial Africa, so too, Lévi-Strauss claimed, should the 
same structural techniques be applied to the analysis of human society. As 
Lévi-Strauss would later clarify:
[Structural linguistics] must also welcome psychologists, sociologists, and 
anthropologists eager to learn from modern linguistics the road which 
leads to the empirical knowledge of social phenomena. (Lévi-Strauss 
1963: 31)
 As a method for revealing hidden aspects within a system through the 
application of general laws and universal constants, structural anthropology 
provided a means to extract and explain that which was unapparent and 
unconscious: ‘The linguist provides the anthropologist with etymologies 
which permit him to establish between certain kinship terms relationships 
that were not immediately apparent’ (Lévi-Strauss 1963: 32). Because of this, 
although the structuralist method was overtly empirical, it was by no means 
constrained by apparent facts and conscious statements. On the contrary, 
Lévi-Strauss’ structural anthropology consistently refused to explain social 
phenomena by deferring to the conscious statements of a speaking subject. 
At all times, what was of greater significance were the structural constants 
to which such statements corresponded, in turn eliciting their true meaning. 
The lessons Lévi-Strauss drew from linguistics for the establishment of his 
structural programme were thus as follows:
First, structural linguistics shifts from the study of conscious linguistic 
phenomena to study of their unconscious infrastructure; second, it does 
not treat terms as independent entities, taking instead as its basis of analysis 
the relations between terms; third, it introduces the concept of system …; 
The Edinburgh Companion to Poststructuralism.indd   73 25/07/2013   14:53:30
emergence74
finally, structural linguistics aims at discovering general laws …. (Lévi-
Strauss 1963: 33)
 These lessons could well have been recited by two other giants of early 
structuralism: Jacques Lacan and Roland Barthes. Perhaps more so than 
any other structuralist, Lacan’s theory and practice of psychoanalysis was 
predicated upon the importance of the unapparent and unconscious aspects 
of subjective experience: ‘nothing could be more misleading for the analyst 
than to seek to guide himself by some supposed “contact” he experiences 
with the subject’s reality’ (Lacan 2006: 210). As with Lévi-Strauss, Lacan’s 
work was quite heavily influenced by structural linguistics. In 1953, Lacan 
delivered an address known as the ‘Rome Report’ in which he set out the 
parameters of psychoanalytic method explicitly along structuralist lines:
Linguistics can serve us as a guide here, since that is the vanguard role it is 
given by contemporary anthropology, and we cannot remain indifferent to 
it. … It is up to us to adopt this approach to discover how it intersects with 
our own field, just as ethnography, which follows a course parallel to our 
own, is already doing by deciphering myths according to the synchrony of 
mythemes. Isn’t it striking that Lévi-Strauss – in suggesting the involve-
ment in myths of language structures and of those social laws that regulate 
marriage ties and kinship – is already conquering the very terrain in which 
Freud situates the unconscious? (Lacan 2006: 235–6)
Lacan was particularly attracted to the scientistic credibility that structural 
linguistics could bestow upon his discipline. Freud, of course, had himself 
always insisted that he was a scientist and not a philosopher or mystic. But 
by the mid-twentieth century, the scientific credentials of psychoanalysis 
were in need of re-certification. Recognising the revolution that was afoot 
in structural linguistics and anthropology, Lacan took the opportunity to 
attach psychoanalysis to this modern movement:
Today, however, the conjectural sciences are discovering once again the 
age-old notion of science, forcing us to revise the classification of the 
sciences we have inherited from the nineteenth century in a direction 
clearly indicated by the most lucid thinkers. (Lacan 2006: 235)
Lacan’s ‘Rome Report’ thus served as a manifesto for psychoanalytic reno-
vation that was to parallel the successes of Lévi-Strauss’ overhaul of anthro-
pology. By rereading Freud through structural linguistics, Lacan erected 
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a psychoanalytic theory and practice that was able to elicit and interpret 
phenomena on the basis of a synchronic and generalisable unconscious 
infrastructure of relations.
 The renowned literary theorist Roland Barthes also worked in and on 
the realm of the unconscious by adopting the structuralist paradigm. His 
role within the movement was, however, slightly different to that of Lévi-
Strauss and Lacan. Barthes was the great synthesiser and advocate of early 
structuralism. Although he shared in the pursuit for scientificity and the 
application of a synchronic and generalisable method for the analysis of texts 
and society, as a consummate writer Barthes’ work retained a literary flour-
ish that was distinct from these aims. The attraction of his work, as such, 
was not so much derived from its scientific promise as it was from its artistic 
merit. In later years Barthes would abandon his pursuit for scientificity, but 
in the 1950s and early ’60s Barthes work was characterised by a resolute 
adherence to the structuralist programme and a commitment to extending 
its scope and popularity.
 Whereas Lévi-Strauss investigated kinship relations in human societies 
and Lacan explored the psychoanalytic unconscious, Barthes subjected 
objects of the everyday to structural analysis: ‘The goal of all structuralist 
activity … is to reconstitute an object in such a way as to reveal the rules 
by which the object functions’ (Barthes 1964: 214). Barthes’ extraordinary 
analyses, however, were not garnered from fieldwork with indigenous cul-
tures or repeated therapeutic sessions with paying clients, nor were they 
confined to these disciplinary settings. His application of the structuralist 
methodology was instead far more eclectic than many of his structuralist 
contemporaries. As just one example, Barthes’ understanding and applica-
tion of ‘signs’ encompassed practically everything that had any meaning 
(Dosse 1997a: 77). This metaphorical usage allowed Barthes to draw all 
kinds of novel and creative connections, helping to facilitate structuralism’s 
profusion. But by the same token, it also took structuralism away from the 
controlled phonetic parameters that it had initially been set, in turn bringing 
its status into question.
 This status would be directly challenged by a number of thinkers closely 
associated with structuralism. The structuralist paradigm, as such, would be 
subjected almost immediately to an internal critique that would later con-
tribute to the materialisation of poststructuralism. Alongside the emergence 
of the structuralist image can therefore be traced a parallel history of its 
transformation to poststructuralism.
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From Structuralism to Poststructuralism: The History 
of Transformation
As the structuralist paradigm was in the process of taking shape, key contri-
butions were made from a number of thinkers who departed from the struc-
turalist norm. Chief among these were Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser and 
Jacques Derrida. In their own ways, these three thinkers contested, modified 
and/or failed to adhere to various aspects of the classical structuralist image. 
For starters, all three were philosophers by trade and tradition. Thus while 
they each held a keen interest in the new developments coming from the 
social sciences, their objective was not exactly to dethrone the discipline of 
philosophy per se, but to reassess its foundations and suggest new directions. 
As a result, these three thinkers, each in their own way, used structuralism 
in order to reinvigorate philosophy rather than usurp it.
 Michel Foucault’s work had the added effect of reconciling history (or 
more specifically, a particular form of history) with the structuralist move-
ment. While structuralists such as Lévi-Strauss were dispensing with his-
tory in favour of science, Foucault was busy subjecting science to one of 
the most radical critiques it had ever faced – a critique, no less, that was 
largely mounted upon historical grounds. Foucault therefore could not fully 
share in the scientistic aspirations of structuralism or its condemnation of 
historical investigations in toto. This is not to say that Foucault was opposed 
to or dismissive of science. As a protégé of Georges Canguilhem, one of the 
great French philosophers of science, Foucault was extremely well informed 
about and interested in the nature and epistemology of science. Indeed, in 
his introduction to Canguilhem’s The Normal and the Pathological, Foucault 
contrasts two lineages of philosophical thought in France largely on the issue 
of science: on the one hand, as Foucault identifies, there is ‘a philosophy of 
knowledge, of rationality and of concept’, which he associates with Bachelard, 
Cavaillès and Canguilhem (and himself); while on the other hand, Foucault 
claims that there is a quite distinct ‘philosophy of experience, of sense 
and of subject’, of which Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are the main French 
proponents (Foucault 1991: 8). This distinction of Foucault’s, furthermore, 
is not merely motivated by scientific and epistemological concerns; there 
is also an implicit political point in Foucault’s opposition. While Cavaillès 
and Canguilhem were staunch members of the Resistance during the Nazi 
occupation of France (the former gave his life to the cause), Sartre’s involve-
ment was rather questionable, in turn casting an unfavourable light on his 
post-war Marxism and political activism. Foucault’s self-association with 
the likes of Cavaillès and Canguilhem as opposed to Sartre was thus entirely 
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consistent with the emerging intellectual trend in France that contrasted 
itself with the traditions of existentialism, humanism and their dubious 
political record in France. Recognising the similarities that he shared with 
structuralism, Foucault wasted no time in positioning himself as a leading 
light of the movement.
 With the publication of History of Madness in 1961, Foucault announced 
a new direction for structuralist thought. As Dosse recounts: ‘Barthes hailed 
this work as the first application of structuralism to history’ (Dosse 1997a: 
155). On the one hand, History of Madness was decidedly structuralist: it 
sought to elicit the vital role that the unapparent (in this case madness) played 
in the operation of apparent norms (in this case reason) through a considera-
tion of their structural relations and systematic consistencies. The debt here 
to Canguilhem’s analysis of the normal and pathological was evident, but so 
too was the new structuralist agenda with which Foucault’s analysis affiliated 
itself. On the other hand, however, History of Madness was a history. Much 
of its persuasive force was thus derived through historical contextualisa-
tion, historical interpretation, and more specifically, the historicisation of 
structures: ‘This structure of the experience of madness, which is history 
through and through, but whose seat is at its margins, where its decisions are 
made, is the object of this study’ (Foucault 2006: xxxii, emphasis added). 
Foucault’s contribution to structuralism, therefore, would be to not only 
strengthen the movement, but also subject it to transformations such as the 
above from a very early stage.
 The work of Louis Althusser also had a profound effect upon the com-
plexion of structuralism. As French Marxists and intellectuals of the Left 
came to terms with the revelations of Soviet repression and recalibrated 
their positions accordingly, Althusser offered many of them an attractive 
alternative to Sartre’s Marxist-humanism. This alternative was predicated, 
to a large extent, on a turning away from established Marxist doctrine and 
its various contingent applications in order to facilitate and focus on a return 
to Marx himself. Reading Capital, first published by Althusser in 1965 with 
contributions from his students at the École Normale Supérieure (including 
Étienne Balibar, Roger Establet, Jacques Rancière and Pierre Macherey), 
would demonstrate the full power of this ‘return’ to the writings of Marx.
 As noted by his early readers (though later disputed by the author), 
Althusser’s ‘reading’ of Capital was coordinate with several principle 
traits of structuralism: his exegesis of Marx’s writings was highly analytic, 
anti-humanistic, marked by its appreciation of scientificity and largely syn-
chronic in method (in so far as Althusser’s reading of Capital was guided 
by ‘the conception of the specific relations that exist between the different 
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elements and the different structures of the structure of the whole’ and ‘the 
knowledge of the relations of dependence and articulation which make it an 
organic whole, a system’ (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 107)). Like a structure 
of social kinship or a linguistic system, Althusser approached Marx’s texts 
as a hermetically sealed set that imbued its own logic (or in some cases sev-
eral). This logic, moreover, could not be solely constructed from the readily 
apparent alone; if anything, the genius of Althusser’s return to Marx was 
that he did not just return to what Marx said, but what Marx did not say 
in what he said. This way of reading Marx was derived by Althusser from 
none other than the very texts to which it was being applied. As Althusser 
noted, Marx did not only comment on what was explicitly ‘said’ by classi-
cal political economists; he more profoundly extracted critical points that 
were ‘unspoken’ in their texts, thus raising problematics that had been as 
yet unrecognised. An appropriate appraisal of capitalism was thus only made 
possible through an examination of the structural relations between the seen 
and the unseen, or more exactly, the blindness that lies at the heart of vision: 
‘non-vision is therefore inside vision, it is a form of vision and hence has 
a necessary relationship with vision’ (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 21). In 
Althusser’s terminology, such forms of examination are ‘symptomatic’ in 
method: ‘A “symptomatic” reading is necessary to … identify behind the 
spoken words the discourse of the silence, which, emerging in the verbal 
discourse, induces these blanks in it, blanks which are failures in its rigour, 
or the outer limits of its effort’ (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 86).
 Althusser made the intellectual sources for this notion of ‘absence’ and 
his ‘symptomatic’ form of reading explicit. Aside from Marx and Nietzsche, 
he asserted that
only since Freud have we begun to suspect what listening, and hence 
what speaking (and keeping silent), means (vet dire); that this ‘meaning’ 
(vouloir dire) of speaking and listening reveals beneath the innocence of 
speech and hearing the culpable depth of a second, quite different dis-
course, the discourse of the unconscious. (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 16)
In a footnote attached to this claim, Althusser went on to credit this reading 
of Freud to Lacan, and furthermore ‘our masters in reading learned works, 
once Gaston Bachelard and Jean Cavaillès and now Georges Canguilhem 
and Michel Foucault’ (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 16). Althusser thus 
firmly placed himself within the same structural and philosophical nexus 
as Foucault.
 Despite his fraught relationship with the French Communist Party 
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(of which he was a long-time member) due to his deviation from Party 
orthodoxy, Althusser’s ‘symptomatic’ method of reading Marx would enjoy 
great success amongst the Left. It would also considerably strengthen the 
structuralist movement by adding to its ranks a significant portion of the 
Marxist intelligentsia in France. By doing so, however, structuralism would 
never be the same: by facilitating a détente between structuralism and 
Marxism within the French intellectual scene (intended or not), the ideal of 
an apolitical social-scientific method would be exposed as naive. But perhaps 
more importantly, the presentation of Marx as a founder of structuralist 
thinking and reading would ultimately accentuate the growing disparities 
between this fast-growing brand of structuralism and the classical image as 
envisioned by Lévi-Strauss and his linguistic associates.
 The early 1960s also witnessed the emergence of a third discordant struc-
turalist philosopher: Jacques Derrida. Of all the thinkers associated with 
structuralism, Derrida’s position was perhaps the most ambiguous. This 
is because, from as early as 1963, Derrida advanced an explicit critique of 
structuralism that would later be labelled as poststructuralist. In a lecture 
presented in March of that year, titled ‘Cogito and the History of Madness’, 
Derrida subjected Foucault’s structuralist history to a scathing attack. 
The crux of this critique was to ask of Foucault the following: from what 
privileged position does Foucault carry out his history of silence and the 
repressed? In his words:
Is not an archaeology, even of silence, a logic, that is, an organized lan-
guage, a project, an order, a sentence, a syntax, a work? Would not the 
archaeology of silence be the most efficacious and subtle restoration, the 
repetition, in the most irreducibly ambiguous meaning of the word, of the 
act perpetrated against madness – and be so at the very moment when this 
act is denounced? (Derrida 1978: 41)
 Derrida’s intention, in short, was to cast doubt on the grounds from which 
Foucault’s analysis derived its authority. This point was simple, yet effective. 
It was also applicable to the rest of the structuralist movement. In 1966, 
three years after delivering his critique of Foucault’s History of Madness, 
Derrida took part in one of the most significant moments in the history of 
structuralism: the colloquium The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences 
of Man, held at Johns Hopkins University. This colloquium – attended by 
Lacan, Barthes, Todorov, Goldmann, Vernant and Derrida among others 
– served as a primer to French structuralism for the American academic 
market. Derrida’s contribution, however, would serve as an announcement 
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of the paradigm’s underside. In his lecture, ‘Structure, Sign, and Play in 
the Discourse of the Human Sciences’, Derrida repeated his critique of 
Foucault, but this time with respect to Lévi-Strauss:
When Lévi-Strauss says in the preface to The Raw and the Cooked that 
he has ‘sought to transcend the opposition between the sensible and the 
intelligible by operating from the outset at the level of signs’, the neces-
sity, force, and legitimacy of his act cannot make us forget that the concept 
of the sign cannot in itself surpass this opposition between the sensible 
and the intelligible. (Derrida 1978: 355)
Following this remark Derrida proceeded to deconstruct Lévi-Strauss’ 
programme and, consequently, reinfuse his structural edifice with ‘what we 
might call the play of the structure’ (Derrida 1978: 352).
 Structuralism’s deconstruction therefore coincided with its arrival on the 
big stage. As the structuralist image was in the process of mass exporta-
tion, Derrida attempted to destabilise its centre of gravity by raising and 
unravelling its metaphysical presuppositions. Far from effectuating a break 
with philosophy, Derrida demonstrated how many structuralists perpetu-
ated some of the most pervasive trends in the history of philosophy, such 
as the privileging of speech over writing that Lévi-Strauss and Jakobson 
both indulge in (see Derrida 1976). Nevertheless, Derrida was by no means 
an opponent or even outsider to the structuralist paradigm, as his involve-
ment in the Johns Hopkins colloquium indicated. Rather, in accordance 
with his methodological approach, Derrida inhabited structuralism, so as to 
deconstruct it from within (Derrida 1976: 24). This approach was strategic 
in more ways than one: irrespective of the dictates of his deconstructive 
method, Derrida knew full well that structuralism at the time was on a path 
to glory. He was therefore quite content, like others, to be grouped under 
the structuralist sign for the time being, despite the obvious discontinuities 
between himself and various other structuralists. As Derrida admitted at 
one point: ‘Since we take nourishment from the fecundity of structuralism, 
it is too soon to dispel our dream’ (Derrida 1978: 3).2 In the mid 1960s, 
structuralism was yet to be fully consecrated, and poststructuralism was but 
a glimmer in the eye of the English-speaking world. Thus, while Derrida 
pursued an internal transformation of structuralism from the early 1960s 
on, the culmination and recognition of this metamorphosis would have to 
wait for a more propitious external moment.
 This moment arrived in May of 1968. By 1968 structuralism had 
transformed itself from a marginalised method of the social sciences to a 
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multifaceted movement that permeated numerous disciplines, including 
stalwarts of the humanities such as philosophy and history. Structuralism 
was enjoying a level of public success akin to the heyday of Sartre and de 
Beauvoir, and on the back of this fervour structuralists were preparing for 
their anointment by academic institutions at all levels, from the Sorbonne 
down to regional lycées. The uprising of May ’68 in Paris would accelerate 
this process, but in doing so it would also expose the movement’s redun-
dancy and help facilitate its overcoming.
 As the student occupiers of the Sorbonne made clear, the spirit of ’68 
was not structuralist: ‘Structures’, read a famous slogan, ‘don’t take to the 
streets’ (Dosse 1997b: 116). This hostility towards structuralism exhib-
ited by elements of the failed revolution is perhaps best explained by the 
untimely nature of May ’68. If May ’68 was a profound social and political 
event, it was in large part due to its inexplicable nature. Nearly everyone, 
including most significantly the structuralist avant-garde, did not see the 
uprising coming. Moreover, the uprising did not neatly correspond to the 
expectations of the French Left who had been long preparing for (and bick-
ering over) the revolution: white middle-class university students were not 
exactly the designated revolutionary class. As such, May ’68 was in many 
ways not a product of its times, but rather an untimely eruption that would 
only later be re-contextualised. Its participants, for the most part, were not 
well organised or agreed on what they hoped to achieve, other than to bring 
down the system. With this in mind, it is unsurprising that structuralism, 
itself the eminent ‘sign of the times’, would be out of sync with this untimely 
rupture. The incompatibility of structuralism with the dissident mentality 
of May ’68 was further emphasised by the fact that structuralism effectively 
promoted unitary and inescapable systems which demanded strict obedi-
ence to a method or procedure, whether that meant swearing fealty to Lacan, 
science or some other master principle/al; following the rules and giving 
oneself over to a universal and irresistible system was not exactly a feature 
of the spirit of ’68.
 And yet, despite this reaction against the rise of structuralism, May ’68 
also offered structuralism the chance to crown its recent successes with 
institutional recognition. As Lévi-Strauss and other early structuralists had 
long recognised, the institutions of French academia were in drastic need 
of modernisation. May ’68 brought this process to immediate fulfilment. As 
the epitome of modern intellectual theory and practice, structuralism was 
perfectly placed to capitalise upon the academic shake-up necessitated by 
May ’68 and convert its popular success into positions of institutional power. 
Thus while structuralism was too conservative and stifling for many of the 
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radical students that instigated the May ’68 uprising, it was sufficiently 
modern-yet-respectable to satisfy the demands for institutional reform.
 Among the many institutional advances that structuralists made in the 
aftermath of May ’68 (such as the appointment of Foucault, and later Barthes, 
to the Collège de France), none were more pronounced than the creation of 
the experimental university at Vincennes (Université de Paris VIII). This 
institution of learning located on the outskirts of Paris was established on a 
structuralist mandate that May ’68 had helped make possible. Foucault, the 
leading figurehead of structuralism at the time following his extraordinar-
ily successful The Order of Things (which at one point had the subtitle An 
Archaeology of Structuralism), was asked to form the Philosophy Department, 
while the structural linguist Jean Dubois was charged with establishing the 
university’s Linguistic Department (Dubois was in fact initially asked to be 
Dean of Vincennes, which he declined). Vincennes also inaugurated the first 
Department of Psychoanalysis, headed by Serge Leclaire – an important 
disciple of Lacan.
 But despite these structuralist overtones, it must be said that in reality 
Vincennes was far too cutting edge to be simply structuralist – a movement 
that even young students knew by that time was old-hat. Thus while it might 
not have been clear to university administrators, May ’68 demonstrated to 
the structuralist thinkers that the game was up. In the period following May 
’68, nearly all of the major structuralist thinkers embarked upon an overhaul 
of their work or attempted to distance themselves from the structuralist 
paradigm (Kurzweil 1996: xii–xiii). To cite an example, when Foucault’s 
next book, The Archaeology of Knowledge, appeared in 1969, he made it clear 
in no uncertain terms that he was not a mere structuralist:
In order to avoid misunderstanding, I should like to begin with a few 
observations. – My aim is not to transfer to the field of history, and 
more particularly to the history of knowledge (connaisances), a struc-
turalist method that has proved valuable in other fields of analysis. My 
aim is to uncover the principles and consequences of an autochthonous 
transformation that is taking place in the field of historical knowledge. 
It may well be that this transformation, the problems that it raises, the 
tools that it uses, the concepts that emerge from it, and the results that 
it obtains are not entirely foreign to what is called structural analysis. 
But this kind of analysis is not specifically used … In short, this book, 
like those that preceded it, does not belong – at least directly, or in the 
first instance – to the debate on structure (as opposed to genesis, history, 
development); it belongs to that field in which the questions of the human 
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being, consciousness, origin, and the subject emerge, interest, mingle, 
and separate off. But it would probably not be incorrect to say that the 
problem of structure arose there too. (Foucault 2002: 17–18)
Althusser, too, would be at pains around this time to clear up any such ‘mis-
understandings’. On the release of the Italian edition of Reading Capital in 
1968, he would take the opportunity to add the following disclaimer in a 
brief preface:
Despite the precautions we took to distinguish ourselves from the ‘struc-
turalist’ ideology (we said very clearly that the ‘combination’ to be found 
in Marx ‘has nothing to do with a combinatory’), despite the decisive 
intervention of categories foreign to ‘structuralism’ (determination in 
the last instance, domination, overdetermination, production process, 
etc.), the terminology we employed was too close in many respects to the 
‘structuralist’ terminology not to give rise to an ambiguity. With a very 
few exceptions (some very perceptive critics have made the distinction), 
our interpretation of Marx has generally been recognized and judged, in 
homage to the current fashion, as ‘structuralist’.
 We believe that despite the terminological ambiguity, the profound 
tendency of our texts was not attached to the ‘structuralist’ ideology. It is 
our hope that the reader will be able to bear this claim in mind, to verify 
it and to subscribe to it. (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 7)
When Althusser and Foucault suggest that they were never really structural-
ists, even if there are resonances between their work and structuralism, we 
can certainly take them at their word. After all, which serious thinker that 
was associated with structuralism at one time or another did not have aspects 
of their work that were incongruous with the classical structuralist image? 
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Althusser, and especially Foucault, only 
really felt it necessary to explicitly point out their distance from structural-
ism once the movement was on the wane. As F. Scott Fitzgerald might have 
put it, by the end of the 1960s it was clear to those intellectuals involved 
that the structuralist plate had cracked, and the only thing left for it was to 
consummate a clean break as best one can, and quickly (Fitzgerald 1945: 
81–4). In light of this, although structuralism during this period was reach-
ing the summit of institutional and popular success, at the ground level of 
academic work structuralism was in severe decline, if not already extinct: 
structuralism in this period, to put it one way, was like an exploding star 
that shines forth most brightly long after it has ceased producing new light.
The Edinburgh Companion to Poststructuralism.indd   83 25/07/2013   14:53:30
emergence84
 The list of academics at Vincennes confirms this shift. While there was 
certainly a strong structuralist presence at Vincennes, including some of 
the movement’s recognised superstars, the majority of academics were not 
card-carrying structuralists, and many of those who were so tainted were 
beating a fast retreat. Among the intellectuals who walked the corridors 
of Vincennes during the late ’60s and early ’70s (at one point or another) 
were Barthes, Dumézil, Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari, Derrida, Lyotard, 
Irigaray, Cixious, Poulantzas, Negri, de Certeau, Balibar, Badiou, 
Rancière, Judith Miller (Lacan’s daughter) and her husband Jacques-
Alain Miller. Despite their debt to structuralism, this roster of thinkers 
did not collectively promote a classical structuralist agenda. In fact, if 
anything, what they all shared was a tendency to push beyond the previous 
established parameters of structuralism in order to inhabit its margins and 
address its blind spots. Vincennes, as such, was not exactly structuralist, 
but poststructuralist.
 This, however, raises the crucial problem mooted at the start of this 
investigation: if even the crowning institution of structuralism was more 
accurately poststructuralist, where does one end and the other begin? And 
more significantly; from what position do we determine this problematic, let 
alone its resolution?
From Structuralism to Poststructuralism: The Problem 
of Transformation
Just as Derrida questioned Foucault in 1963, we must ask ourselves 
now: in the name of what authority does this history of the transforma-
tion from structuralism to poststructuralism proceed? Given that other 
thinkers associated with poststructuralism, such as Gilles Deleuze, pose 
similar sorts of questions,3 we might consider this to be a pre-eminently 
poststructuralist problematic. As it happens, ‘problem’ is precisely the 
right word when it comes to Deleuze. During the 1950s and ’60s, Deleuze 
produced a series of monographs on individual thinkers, including Hume, 
Bergson, Proust, Nietzsche, Spinoza and Kant. As established scholars 
from the academic field of each thinker would concur, Deleuze’s readings 
of these thinkers are highly idiosyncratic and at times perverse. This is 
because in each case Deleuze attempts to elicit what he believes are the 
critical problems articulated by the oeuvre of each thinker – problems 
that may not always be explicitly apparent in the text, but traverse them 
throughout and provide the source of their vitality. As a consequence, 
Deleuze is never that interested in debating points of contention with his 
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contemporaries. His intention is to rather distil the problematic of each 
great thinker that produces something worth knowing. As he explains in 
an interview of 1968:
When you are facing such a work of genius, there’s no point saying you 
disagree. First you have to know how to admire; you have to rediscover 
the problems he poses, his particular machinery. It is through admiration 
that you will come to genuine critique. The mania of people today is not 
knowing how to admire anything: either they’re ‘against’, or they situate 
everything at their own level while they chit-chat and scrutinize. That’s 
no way to go about it. You have to work your way back to those problems 
which an author of genius has posed, all the way back to that which he does 
not say in what he says, in order to extract something that still belongs to 
him, though you also turn it against him. You have to be inspired, visited 
by the geniuses you denounce. (Deleuze 2004: 139)
 There are clear resonances here between Deleuze’s problematic approach 
to the history of philosophy and Althusser’s interpretation of Marx’s method 
of reading: ‘To understand this necessary and paradoxical identity of non-
vision and vision within vision itself is very exactly to pose our problem 
(the problem of the necessary connexion which unites the visible and the 
invisible), and to pose it properly is to give ourselves a chance of solving it’ 
(Althusser and Balibar 1970: 21). But while Marx’s problematic philosophy 
is no doubt influential on Deleuze, the emergence of Deleuze’s concern for 
the problem can be traced to another source: Henri Bergson. In his book 
Bergsonism (1966), Deleuze contends that Bergsonian intuition – the concept 
in Bergson’s philosophy that was notoriously parodied by Bertrand Russell 
for its vagueness – is a supremely rigorous and precise method (Deleuze 
1991: 13). This method, moreover, is ‘an essentially problematizing method’ 
(Deleuze 1991, 35). Drawing heavily from an essay in Bergson’s Creative 
Mind (‘Introduction II: Stating of the Problems’), Deleuze notes that from 
an early age people are trained to search for solutions to problems that they 
have been given – problems that are, in other words, ‘ready made’. Many 
of these problems, however, are false, either because they are ‘nonexistent’ 
or ‘badly stated’. This is to say that such inherited problems no longer 
fit the circumstances in which they find themselves, and are thus in need 
of restating in a manner that is more appropriate. Because solutions are 
always respective to the problems they are solutions of, Bergson argues that 
a ‘problem is solved as soon as it is properly stated’ (Bergson 2007: 37). 
When this is done, false problems evaporate (rather than become ‘solved’) 
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and the problems that remain are ones that we truly deserve – they are our 
problems, not someone else’s.4
 Deleuze’s Bergsonism, in a way, perfectly illustrates what our problem 
is at present: while innovative social scientists and philosophers/historians 
attentive to their developments were busy during the 1950s promoting the 
new intellectual vogue that was structuralism, Deleuze was off studying 
philosophers such as Bergson and Hume – philosophers that were hardly 
fashionable in Parisian coffee houses at the time. Deleuze therefore did not 
take part in the structuralist wave in the same manner that many of his con-
temporaries did, such as Foucault and Derrida. This little fact, as Bergson 
would say, is big with meaning. How are we to understand the contribution 
of a figure such as Deleuze to the problematic of poststructuralism and its 
relation to structuralism? For instance, it is not uncommon for Deleuze to 
be categorised as a ‘new’ or ‘late’ poststructuralist (as opposed to ‘early’ ones 
like Derrida).5 On one level – the factual level – such descriptions are simply 
false: Deleuze did not come ‘after’ Derrida in time or in conceptual pro-
gression. Indeed, many of Deleuze’s most enduring and critical ideas (such 
as the theory of multiplicity developed from Bergson) were already fully 
formed in the 1950s, and are thus contemporaneous with structuralism, let 
alone ‘early’ poststructuralism. But on another level, such descriptions are 
not necessarily the product of a false problem. If Deleuze is presented as 
coming ‘after’ Derrida, it is not only because the wider public became aware 
of Deleuze after Derrida,6 but also because the problematic of poststructur-
alism, according to the manner in which it was first constructed, demands 
that this is the case.
 Deleuze is therefore an interesting figure for our analysis of the trans-
formation from structuralism to poststructuralism for he complicates our 
chronology and requires that we consider the problematic through which we 
perceive his work. As with most other French intellectuals who lived through 
the age of structuralism, Deleuze was hardly unaffected by the movement. 
His The Logic of Sense and Anti-Oedipus, for example, contain crucial engage-
ments with Lacanian psychoanalysis, while he references nearly all the other 
major structuralists at some point in his career. Deleuze even wrote an essay 
in 1967 titled ‘How do we recognise structuralism?’7 But as this essay reveals, 
it is difficult to articulate Deleuze’s relationship to structuralism. Much 
like his treatment of individual philosophers in previous works, the essay 
on structuralism does not summarise or provide a description of a widely 
recognisable classical image of structuralism. Instead, it attempts to extract 
a novel and creative force that has an uncanny similarity to Deleuze’s own 
philosophy. Perhaps it is for this reason that the essay is often considered 
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to be more poststructuralist than structuralist, or at least structuralism ‘in 
a very radical guise’ (Williams 2005: 53). But if this is so, and if Deleuze’s 
approach to the essay and indeed many of the concepts expressed in it are 
contiguous with his monographs of the 1950s, then we would have to say 
that those monographs are also poststructuralist. If this were the case, 
what would it mean to suggest that some poststructuralist works, such as 
Deleuze’s Empiricism and Subjectivity (1953) and his groundbreaking essays 
on Bergson in the mid 1950s, predate the publication of some of the major 
structuralist works, such as Lévi-Strauss’ Structural Anthropology (1958) 
and Foucault’s History of Madness (1961)? Such a suggestion is only ren-
dered sensible when directed through the problematics of structuralism, 
poststructuralism and the transformation between them. Deleuze’s early 
concepts that are propelled throughout his later works can then, at best, be 
described as untimely – the sign of a ‘time to come’ (Nietzsche 1983: 60), 
since they do not sufficiently align with the structuralist sign of the times. 
The problematic is then restated to incorporate the following: what is the 
relation between an untimely rupture, the time in which it occurs, and the 
time in which it is retrospectively recognised as untimely?
 Nevertheless, in the case of some thinkers other than Deleuze whose 
careers spanned structuralism and poststructuralism, the transformation 
between the two paradigms is arguably much more straightforward. Unlike 
Foucault and Althusser, who would come to downplay their involvement 
with structuralism, or Derrida, who could claim with some legitimacy that 
he was always on the edge of the paradigm (the limit within the centre), 
Barthes’ fidelity to the structuralist programme during the 1950s and early 
’60s was most explicit and undeniable. So too was the moment that he 
abandoned the classical structuralist programme. In 1970, the publication 
of Barthes’ S/Z heralded a new phase in his career that markedly deviated 
from his previous classical structuralist positions. In its opening passage, 
S/Z derides those analysts who would ‘see all the world’s stories (and there 
have been ever so many) within a single structure’, for such an approach 
disregards the irreducible difference in and of each text – the ‘difference 
of which each text is the return’ (Barthes 1974: 3).8 This new direction, as 
Barthes acknowledged, was heavily influenced by a set of thinkers that would 
later be called poststructuralist.9 Julia Kristeva, in particular, was largely 
responsible for this change in tack by Barthes. As a recent Bulgarian émigré 
in Paris, Kristeva brought with her fresh ideas about language and literary 
analysis that would radically challenge aspects of the existing structuralist 
doctrine. In 1966 she delivered a lecture that employed the work of Mikhail 
Bakhtin – a largely unknown figure in France at the time – for the purposes 
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of reconfiguring structuralism. Her goal, as with Derrida, was to give ‘dyna-
mism to structuralism’,10 and thus replace the staid and synchronic nature 
of classical structuralism with a genuinely dynamic model that imbued 
perpetual genesis. Upon hearing this lecture, Barthes reassessed his position 
and almost immediately adopted elements of Kristeva’s approach, such as 
her ‘intertextual’ methodology.11
 A relatively clear case, such as Barthes’, can tell us much about the ‘on 
the ground’ theoretical issues that indicate a shift from structuralism to 
poststructuralism. Meticulous analysis of the relevant texts and interviews 
should dispel many erroneous generalisations and regurgitated inaccuracies 
(some of which have been necessarily repeated in this chapter). But despite, 
or perhaps more accurately, aside from the value of careful reading, it must be 
acknowledged that the problem of the transformation from structuralism to 
poststructuralism does not only concern what this or that thinker said, nor 
can it be exhausted or resolved by settling upon a ‘correct’ reading of their 
corpus. This is because the problems at hand are far greater than the think-
ers themselves. The reality of their various poststructuralisms, therefore, 
cannot be reduced to textual interpretation, regardless of how faithful or 
impressive the analysis may be.
 In an excellent work on poststructuralism, James Williams warns against 
reducing the work of thinkers such as Derrida and Foucault to the problem of 
poststructuralism. Poststructuralism, in his view, is rather defined by these 
great works (Williams 2005: 25–6). An understanding of poststructuralism, 
in other words, can be accumulated through an investigation of Derrida’s 
method of deconstruction, Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, and so on, 
but poststructuralism must not be presumptively deployed as a means for 
constructing an understanding of those thinkers. Williams’ sentiment is a 
good one: as Althusser showed in the case of Marxism, any ‘ism’ can argu-
ably benefit from a return to what the relevant thinkers actually said (or 
what is not said in what they say). But it is also wilfully limited. As pointed 
out above, Althusser’s return to the texts was in part motivated by a desire 
to turn away from realities in the East and respond to new challenges in the 
West. This allowed for much creative ‘Theory’, but it also compromised the 
work, for it denied to a large extent the active involvement of extratextual 
elements in the constitution of the problematic. It is questionable, there-
fore, how far Williams can turn away from extratextual realities in the West 
that contributed to the formation of poststructuralism, if the objective is 
to gain an understanding of poststructuralism, including its seminal texts. 
Poststructuralism, as it is currently understood and deployed, may contain 
many assertions that have been derived from lazy readings of Derrida or 
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too little familiarity with Deleuze’s solo works, but this problematic still has 
very real effects in the world of academia and beyond. Like Deleuze and 
Guattari say of capitalism, its contradictions do not necessarily harm it, but 
perhaps make it stronger, for better or worse (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 
151). This was indeed precisely the case with structuralism: if Lévi-Strauss 
had been consistently read in the way that he wanted, it is probable that 
structuralism would not have spread as it did or led to poststructuralism.12 
This is not to say that all misreadings are good, or that what a thinker writes 
is necessarily of secondary importance to the circumstance of the reader. It 
is also not to say that one necessarily needs to understand poststructuralism 
in order to understand Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. But it is to insist 
upon a recognition of the importance that extratextual elements play in the 
determination of poststructuralism, including the texts this problematic 
embraces, if one wishes to fully understand poststructuralism, as opposed 
to analyse the texts of Deleuze, Derrida, and so on.
 So, what exactly is this poststructuralist problematic? Or as Deleuze might 
have modified, how do we recognise this problem across a number of divergent 
works and locales? What are its singularities, critical points of change and 
indeterminacies? Who is it that employs the term, where, when and why? I will 
leave these questions for others in this volume to ascertain more fully. But as 
a way of concluding my contribution, I would suggest that the following be 
borne in mind when pursuing these issues: to understand poststructuralism 
requires that an attempt be made to articulate both its history and its prob-
lematic structure (accompanied, of course, by a reading of the relevant texts). 
On the one hand, an analysis of the former will illustrate how a historical 
transformation occurs from structuralism to poststructuralism – a historical 
transformation, furthermore, that occurs on both a theoretical level (such as 
the structuralist elevation of the unapparent/unconscious that is then taken 
up, modified and/or discarded by poststructuralists), and an extratextual 
level (such as the contribution of May ’68 to the contours of poststructuralist 
theories and their popular success). On the other hand, an analysis of the latter 
will remind us that it matters a great deal what we presuppose and obscure in 
the pursuit of this history; that it matters where we begin and hope to arrive. 
For what would poststructuralism be if we began with Deleuze and then added 
Derrida (or not)? And what does structuralism become when it is played off 
the presumption of a later poststructuralism? Could it not be that it is only in 
this retrospective moment of ‘radical’, ‘ultra’ or ‘post’ structuralism that the 
‘classical’ image first appears? This double reminder might reconstitute the 
original structuralist battle between genesis and structure, historical origins 
and synchronic laws, or as poststructuralists might reconfigure, Being and 
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Becoming; a conflict, moreover, that can no doubt be located throughout 
the history of philosophy, and thus responded to in a number of ways. But 
provided that we make this problem our own, there is every chance that it will 
make a valuable contribution to the world today.
Notes
 1. See Lundy (2009: 189–91).
 2. Derrida was not the only one aware of the benefits to be had at the time by 
associating oneself with the structuralist brand. When Julian Greimas went to 
publish a book in 1966, tentatively titled Semantics, he was told by Jean Dubois: 
‘You will sell a thousand more copies if you add the word structural’ (Algirdas 
Julien Greimas, quoted by Jean-Claude Chevalier and Pierre Encreve, Langue 
francaise, p. 97, as found in Dosse 1997a: 317).
 3. ‘History’, Deleuze and Guattari contend, ‘is one with the triumph of States’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 394).
 4. At this point in the text Deleuze in fact refers to Marx, noting that ‘We might 
compare the last sentence of this extract from Bergson with Marx’s formula-
tion, which is valid for practice itself: “Humanity only sets itself problems that 
it is capable of solving” ’ (Deleuze 1991: 16).
 5. See, for example, Sarup (1993: 4).
 6. Although well known amongst intellectual circles in France from the 1950s, 
Deleuze did not become a widely recognisable figure until the publication of 
Anti-Oedipus (1972) with Félix Guattari. Furthermore, the English-speaking 
world would have to wait until 1994 before a translation of his magnum opus 
Difference and Repetition appeared, thus contributing to his ‘late’ arrival.
 7. This essay was published in 1972 in a collection on the history of philosophy 
compiled by François Châtelet (Histoire de la philosophie, vol. VIII: Le XXe 
Siècle, ed. F. Châtelet, Paris: Hachette, pp. 299–335). In the opening to the 
piece, however, Deleuze indicates that it was written around 1967.
 8. Although present in the work of several poststructuralists, Deleuze is per-
haps most responsible for promoting this notion of the ‘return of difference’. 
According to Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s eternal return in his 
Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962), it is not the same that eternally returns (as 
argued by Heidegger) but difference: ‘Every time we understand the eternal 
return as the return of a particular arrangement of things after all the other 
arrangements have been realised, every time we interpret the eternal return 
as the return of the identical or the same, we replace Nietzsche’s thought with 
childish hypotheses. No one extended the critique of all forms of identity fur-
ther than Nietzsche’ (Deleuze 1986: xi–xii).
 9. In an interview with Raymon Bellour printed in Les Lettres francaises (May 20, 
1970), Barthes cites the conceptual creditors of S/Z as ‘Lacan, Julia Kristeva, 
Sollers, Derrida, Deleuze, Serres, among others’ (Barthes 1985: 78).
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 10. Julia Kristeva, ‘Le mot, le dialogue et le roman’ (1966); reprinted in Semiotke, 
recherches pour une semanalyse, as found in Dosse (1997b: 55).
 11. When pressed on his distancing from a semiology that ‘reveals a structure’ in 
favour of one that ‘produces a structuration’, Barthes asserted that ‘one must 
go beyond the statics of the first semiology, which tried precisely to discover 
structures, structure-products, object-spaces in a text, in order to discover what 
Julia Kristeva calls a productivity – i.e., a working of the text, a junction, a 
coupling into the shifting infinity of language’ (Barthes 1985: 73).
 12. In fact, Lévi-Strauss welcomed the demise of the structuralist vogue, since 
he considered many of the developments made in its name to be unhelpful 
perversions of his original structuralist programme. As he remarked in 1973, 
‘structuralism, happily, has not been in style since 1968’ (Dosse 1997b: 115).
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